The Being of the Beautiful: Plato's Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman by Plato & Benardete Seth

Author:Plato & Benardete, Seth [Plato & Benardete, Seth]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Philosophy, Classics
ISBN: 9780226670379
Amazon: 0226670376
Goodreads: 4734523
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Published: 1984-06-01T07:00:00+00:00

Soc: But their being, and that the pair of them is, and their oppositeness to each other, and in turn the being of oppositeness itself, the soul itself, by going back over them and comparing them to one another, tries to judge for us.

Theae: Very much so.

Soc: Aren’t some things present by nature for both human beings and animals to perceive right from birth, all [C] those experiences that stretch through the body to the soul, while other things, gathered up about these in {86} connection with their being and advantageousness, come to be present with difficulty and over time, through many troubles and through education, to those to whom they come to be present at all?

Theae: Absolutely so.

Soc: Is it possible, then, for someone who doesn’t even reach being to reach truth?

Theae: It’s out of one’s power.

Soc: And will anyone ever be a knower of that about which he fails to reach the truth?

[D] Theae: How could he, Socrates?

Soc: Therefore, knowledge is not present in the experiences, but in the process of gathering together what’s involved in them, for in the latter, as it seems, there is a power to come in touch with being and truth, but in the former there is no power.

Theae: So it appears.

Soc: Then will you really call the former and the latter the same thing, when the pair of them has such great differences in it?

Theae: It wouldn’t be just, at any rate.

Soc: So what name do you give to the former, the seeing, hearing, smelling, feeling cold, feeling hot?

[E] Theae: Perceiving, I’d say; what else?

Soc: In total, then, you call it perception?

Theae: Necessarily.

Soc: And it, we’re saying, has no share in coming in touch with truth, since it doesn’t with being either.

Theae: No, indeed it hasn’t.

Soc: Nor, therefore, has it any share in knowledge.

Theae: No, it hasn’t.

Soc: Therefore, Theaetetus, perception and knowledge could not ever be the same thing.

Theae: {87} It appears not, Socrates; and it has now become most obvious that knowledge is different from perception.

[187A] Soc: But it was not at all for the sake of this that we began discussing it, to find out what knowledge is not, but what it is. Nevertheless, we’ve made this much progress at least, that we won’t look for it in perception at all, but in that name, whatever it is, that the soul has when it occupies itself, by itself, with beings.

Theae: Well that, at any rate, Socrates, as I suppose, is called having opinion.

Soc: You’re correct about supposing it, dear fellow. But look [B] again now, from the start, once you’ve wiped away all the previous things, and see whether you observe anything more, since you’ve come forward to this point, and tell me once again what knowledge is.

Theae: To say it’s all opinion, Socrates, is out of one’s power, since there’s also false opinion, but there is a chance that true opinion is knowledge, and let that be my answer. For if it shows to us as we go on that it’s not, we’ll try to say something else, just as we’re doing now.

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